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INTRODUCTION

As you read this, a man passes through the worn turnstile of a Manhattan
subway. He sits on a bench and waits patiently. With his head resting on a
wall tile that has been graffitied "Remember 9-11," he brushes his hair back
and adjusts his rimless eyeglasses to watch commuters buzz past on their
way to or from their offices. He is virtually invisible with his rather
insignificant looks, one of perhaps a million people to scuttle across the
dirtied tiles of the New York City subway system today. From a bench, he
stands to stretch his legs. He glances left and right, and deftly threads
himself between a mother and her child as he meanders toward the platform
ledge. "Pardon me." As he leans on a pillar, a woman bumps into him but
barely notices as she scoots along. Across three sets of train tracks, he sees
an identical sea of bustling people before they are cut from view by a
passing train.
With a smooth motion, he removes his backpack from around his
shoulder, placing it by his feet. He flicks his gum to the tracks below and
bends to unzip his bag. A young man peeks down at him from behind a
magazine, but returns instantly to the more captivating matters of celebrity
gossip. Reaching into his backpack, he removes a small glass bottle, no
larger than a jelly jar. With a flick of his wrist, he sends the jar tumbling to
the tracks below, where the shards of scattered glass disrupt a snacking
rodent. The man brushes off his hands, gathers his bag, and leaves the
subway unnoticed. The event is drowned out by people's everyday affairs.
For the past several years, major media outlets have described similar
situations that potentially result in the deaths of tens of thousands of
people.' The CBS Evening News, for instance, reported in 1999 that "a
* Associate, Pepper Hamilton, LLP. B.A., LaSalle University; J.D., College of William &
Mary School of Law. Mr. Brown can be contacted at brownme@pepperlaw.com.
1. See, e.g., NPR: Talk of the Nation, Politics of Biological War (NPR radio broadcast
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light bulb-sized container [of smallpox] unleashed in the New York City
subway would infect everyone in the system within hours... [and] people
riding these trains could... [spread] the virus throughout the country and
even the world." 2 While stories such as this are intended to increase public
awareness about potential terrorist events, they also incite fear that such an
event is likely. Certainly, since the anthrax attacks in 2001, the public has
been acutely aware of our vulnerability to bioterrorism. 3 In fact, a
Time/CNN/Harris Interactive poll conducted in October 2001 indicated that
seventy percent of the public believed that a subsequent biological or
chemical attack on the United States would occur before October 2002. 4 As
recently as May 2004, a similar poll indicated that seventy-nine percent of
those surveyed believe that a bioterrorist attack is likely to occur
somewhere in the world within the next five years.5
In the wake of September 11th and the 2001 anthrax attacks, the federal
6
government was very receptive to popular public concerns. It also was
aware of our complete lack of preparedness for a biological attack.7 The
anthrax attacks demonstrated local, state, and federal confusion, in addition
to a lack of clear leadership, resources, and manpower. 8 They highlighted a
public health infrastructure plagued by decreasing budgets, poor facilities,
inadequate laboratories, and shortages of properly trained employees.
Although the need to reexamine state public health law infrastructure has
been apparent for many years, the terrorist events in 2001 led the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to hasten its effort to develop
model emergency public health legislation. 9 The result was the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), which aims to correct

Nov. 24, 1997) (interview by Ray Suarez with Richard Preston, author of THE COBRA EVENT
(1998)) (transcript on file with ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW); ABC News: Good Morning
America, Saddam 's Biological Weapons Bio-Chem Weapons: A Whole New Level of Terror

(ABC television broadcast, Nov. 17, 1997), availableat 1997 WL 15444471.
2.

See CBS News: Evening News with Dan Rather, Smallpox Could Be Making a

Comeback (CBS television broadcast, June 24, 1999), availableat 1999 WL 16009378.
3. For a definition of bioterrorism, see infra note 45.
4. Public Expects More TerroristAttacks, Snapshots, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 2001, at IA.
5. See Alexander Grimwade, Many Mindsets on Bioterrorism, THE SCIENTIST, May 24,
2004, at 12, availableat http://www.the-scientist.com/yr2004/may/bench_040524.html.

6. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-03-373,
PREPAREDNESS VARIED ACROSS STATE AND LOCAL JURISDICTIONS 1 (2003).
7.

See id. at 33-35.

8.

Id. at 5-6;

BIOTERRORISM:

BD. ON HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION, INST. OF MED., THE

FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 124, 126 (2003) [hereinafter IOM

Report].
9.
Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health Emergencies:
Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and"the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 19 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 383 (2003).
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shortcomings in current state public health law, and to provide state public
health departments more guidance in responding to acts of bioterrorism.' 0
The effort was designed to quickly affect state public health departments'
practices in order to "facilitate the detection, management and containment
of public health emergencies .... ""
However, MSEHPA was hastily drafted and has been the subject of great
criticism.' 2 One fundamental problem with MSEHPA is that it directs state
officials to act as the principal responders to a bioterrorist attack, yet
individual state health departments are grossly underfunded, understaffed,
and undertrained to successfully manage the fallout from a bioterrorist
attack. 3 Despite this and several other flaws, thirty-four states and the
District of Columbia have already passed
some version of the Act, and nine
14
other states are presently considering it.
Operating from the premise that the goal of a sound bioterrorist
preparedness and response plan is disease containment and protection of the
most number of people possible, this article argues that the United States'
present course of action is poorly conceived and that recent efforts to
improve state public health departments have failed. Rather than focusing
on individual states' efforts, as envisioned by MSEHPA, an optimal plan
for the United States must include state regionalization for the initial
response to a bioterrorist attack.
This argument proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the major
provisions of MSEHPA and presents some initial criticisms. Part II
discusses the nature of bioterrorism by briefly describing its history and
evaluating the present threat to the United States, and concludes that rushed
state and federal policy-making efforts are unnecessary. Recognizing the
need to define our present preparedness despite facing no imminent threat
of harm, Part III examines the United States' response capabilities and
10. See id. at 382-83; Denise Rios Rodriguez, Liberties vs. Disease, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
30, 2004, availableat WL 08/30/04 NLJ 13, *2; Press Release, Statement by HHS Secretary
Tommy G. Thompson Regarding the Model Emergency Health Powers Act, Dep't Health &
Human Servs. (Oct. 30, 2001), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/
20011030.html (stating that MSEHPA "will be an important tool for state and local officials
to respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies.").
11. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health
and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 16 (2003) [hereinafter
Gostin 1].
12. See, e.g., George J.Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism:Public Health and Liberty in
the 21st Century, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 33, 47 (2003) (noting that "[t]he act was written under
extreme time pressure and in the state of high emotion.").
13. See discussion infra Part III.D.
14. CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.'s HEALTH, THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH
POWERS ACT
STATE
LEGISLATIVE
ACTIVITY
(July
1, 2004), available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPALegis Activity.pdf.
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shortfalls in light of simulated bioterrorist attacks and the 2001 anthrax
attacks. Part IV discusses recent efforts to improve local and state health
departments, arguing that little progress has been made and that state
regionalization represents a better mechanism by which to optimize
bioterrorism responsiveness.
I. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT

Many state public health laws date back to the early twentieth century.15
Consequently, they do not reflect the advances made in public health
science and management in the last century, like surveillance of, prevention
of, and response to disease.1 6 Many of these statutes also predate changes
in constitutional and statutory law, and conflict with contemporary notions
of due process rights and modem disability law.' 7 Moreover, because
individual state health codes have developed independently, state public
health departments vary greatly in their structures, functions, and in the
procedures they use to carry out these functions. 18 MSEHPA represents an
attempt to address these shortcomings while also expanding states' power
in the event of a bioterrorist attack.' 9
On October 6, 2001, the General Counsel for the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) invited the Center for Law and Public's
Health (CLPH), a public health resource center run by Georgetown and
Johns Hopkins Universities, to draft a model emergency response code.2 °
On October 30, 2001, the CLPH submitted its first draft of MSEHPA to
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) Tommy Thompson. 2' As
of July 1, 2004, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia had passed
some form of MSEHPA and it is presently under consideration in nine other
states .22

MSEHPA contains five major provisions. First, health care officials
must report "all cases of persons who harbor any illness or health condition
that may be potential causes of a public health emergency" to a public
health authority within twenty-four hours of observing such an illness or

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Gostin 1, supra note 11, at 10.
Id.
Reich, supranote 9, at 383.
Gostin 1, supra note 11, at 11; Rodriguez, supra note 10, at * 1.
Rodriguez, supra note 10, at *2; Reich, supra note 9, at 383; Gostin 1, supra note

11, at 16-17.
20. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Law and Ethics in a Public Health Emergency, HASTINGS CTR.
REPORT, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 9, 10 [hereinafter Gostin 2].
21. See Press Release, supra note 10.
22. CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.'S HEALTH, supra note 14.
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health condition.2 3 Additionally, pharmacists are required to report any
unusual or increased use of prescription drugs.24 By themselves, these
provisions do not seem unusual; however, the amount of detail that medical
professionals must report is quite alarming. Pharmacists must report the
name, address, medical condition, location, and any other information that
is considered relevant to the "potential causes of a public health
emergency. ,25 Such a detailed reporting requirement associated with such a
broad qualifying standard raises personal privacy concerns and has come
under harsh criticism. 26 One commentator has gone so far as to note the

irony "that there are no provisions for the protection of confidentiality or
privacy written into the statute, although... the authors have had the
foresight to immunize public officials from liability for exceeding their
powers. 27
The second major provision of MSEHPA authorizes governors to declare
29
states of emergency. 28 While this grant of power is not itself significant,
the power MSEHPA grants associated with this provision is problematic.
Allowing the governor to declare a state of emergency under MSEHPA
triggers Articles V and VI, which confer extraordinary powers of
confiscation and coercive medical treatment.
30
Article V authorizes the confiscation and rationing of personal property
by allowing state officials to acquire and/or destroy personal property, use
privately owned facilities and materials, and ration items such as "food,
fuel, clothing, and other commodities. '31 Although section 506 requires
just compensation for confiscated property,32 this provision has nonetheless
been the center of criticism, being called "[p]erhaps
the most dangerous and
33
unprecedented provision[ ]" of MSEHPA.1
23. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 301(a), (c) (Ctr. for Law &
the Pub.'s Health, Draft for Discussion Dec. 21, 2001), available at
http://publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004) [hereinafter
MSEHPA].
24. Id.§ 301(b)
25.
26.

Id.§ 301(b), (c).
See, e.g., Annas, supra note 12, at 49-50; Ken Wing, Policy Choices and Model

Acts: Preparingfor the Next Public Health Emergency, 13

HEALTH MATRIX 71,

74-75

(2003).
27. Wing, supra note 26, at 75.
28. MSEHPA, supra note 23, § 401.
29. In fact, governors already have the power to declare states of emergency under
natural disaster statutes. Wing, supra note 26, at 76.
30. MSEHPA, supra note 23, §§ 501-507.
31. Id. § 502(c).
32. Id.§ 506.
33. Jennifer King, Power Grab: The State in a State of Emergency, The Model
Emergency Health Powers Act, ALEC ISSUE ANALYSIS (Jan. 2002).
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The fourth major provision of MSEHPA, Article VI, allows health
officials to use "every available means to prevent the transmission of
infectious disease and to ensure that all cases of contagious disease are
subject to control and treatment."34 To this end, public health officials can
force citizens to undergo physical examinations and/or tests as necessary to
diagnose the individual. 35 Additionally, officials can forcibly vaccinate
citizens or quarantine those who refuse to comply, including those who
object on religious or philosophical grounds.36 The quarantine provision is
most troubling, as it allows for a maximum of fifteen days of quarantine
before an individual has a right to be heard by a court, although the public
health authority may petition for an extra ten days of isolation.37
Finally, as mentioned above, MSEHPA contains an immunity provision
protecting "the State, its political subdivisions ... the Governor, the public
health authority, or any other State or local official referenced in this Act"
from liability for death, injury or property damage, unless those individuals
have engaged in gross negligence or willful misconduct. 38 The same
immunity extends to private citizens, firms and corporations, along with
their employees and agents both during the performance of a contract with
the state or its political subdivisions,
and when any of these groups assist or
39
request.
state's
the
at
advise
In response to pressures resulting from an acute public sense of
vulnerability, 40 the federal government quickly encouraged state legislatures
to update their existing statutes or replace them entirely with MSEHPA. 41
The hastened drafting of MSEHPA and the subsequent race to the state
legislature to enact it, however, is quickly leading the United States down
the wrong path to properly prepare for a bioterrorist attack. Moreover, this
course of action creates the false impression that the United States is better
prepared for a bioterrorist attack than actually is the case.
MSEHPA cannot optimize the United States' response to a bioterrorist
attack. By authorizing individual states to act as primary responders in a
bioterrorist attack, MSEHPA overlooks issues that will ultimately minimize
its effectiveness. The speed with which disease spreads in the twenty-first
century,42 coupled with gaping differences between funding, staffing, and
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

MSEHPA, supranote 23, § 601.
Id. § 602.
Id. § 603(a).
Id. § 605(a).
Id. § 804(a).
Id. §§ 804(b)(2), (3).

40.

Public Expects More TerroristAttacks, supra note 4, at IA.

41.
42.

Press release, supranote 10.
SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), for example, spread throughout the
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101

resource levels of state and local public health departments, dictate the need
for a broad, uniform response that is readily available through state
regionalization. 3
Further, as demonstrated below, the history of
bioterrorism and the inherent difficulties of developing and successfully
disbursing a biological agent suggest that the United States is not in
imminent danger of a bioterrorist attack and has little to lose by
reevaluating its current bioterrorism response strategy.
II. THE NATURE OF BIOTERRORISM
A. History of Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism and biowarfare 44 are not recent phenomena. The use of
biowarfare has been documented as early as the sixth century B.C. when the
Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with rye ergot, and Solon of Athens used
skunk cabbage to poison the water supply of Krissa 5 In the fourth century
B.C., Scythian archers attempted to poison their enemies by dipping arrows
in tainted blood and manure. 46 Presenting enemies with disease-laden
clothing and contaminating enemy water supplies with human and animal
corpses were
also common tactics from the twelfth century to as late as the
47
Civil War.

world in less than one month. See NPR: Talk of the Nation/Science Friday, Analysis:
Disease Surveillance (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 15, 2004) (interview by Ira Flatow with
Maryn McKenna, author of BEATING BACK THE DEVIL: ON THE FRONT LINES WITH THE
DISEASE DETECTIVES OF THE EPIDEMIC INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (2004), available at 2004 WL
59468868, at *13).
43. See discussion infra Parts III.D. and IV.A. for a more detailed discussion of each of
these factors.
44. The CDC defines "bioterrorism" as the intentional release of viruses, bacteria, or
toxins for the purpose of harming or killing civilians, as distinct from chemical weapons
attacks, which involve, inter alia, fertilizer bombs or the release of deadly gases. CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE
PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM

43 (2001), available

at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Documents/Planning/PlanningGuidance.pdf"
Throughout this
article, "biowarfare" will refer to the use of bioterrorism during periods of war; "biodefense"
refers to the use of prophylactic measures, such as biological screening tools, used to defend
against bioterrorism or biowarfare; "biopreparedness" refers to the availability of
administrative mechanisms in the event of bioterrorism or biowarfare; and "bioresponse" is
the use of the biopreparedness mechanisms in the event of bioterrorism or biowarfare.
45. Biological Terrorism Response Manual, History of Bioterrorism, at
http://bioterry.com/HistoryBioTerr.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2004) (on file with ANNALS OF
HEALTH LAW)

46.

[hereinafter History of Bioterrorism].

Guy B.

ROBERTS, UNITED STATES AIRFORCE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

STUDIES, OCCASIONAL PAPER No.

49,

ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT ARMS CONTROL

15 (2003),

at http://www.usafa.edu/inss/OCP/OCP49.pdf.
47. ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 15; History of Bioterrorism, supra note 45.
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Modem biowarfare began in 1932, when Japanese physician Shiro Ishii
undertook the first scientific studies of biological agents to develop them as
weapons.48 Dr. Ishii erected a 150-building complex called Unit 731, where
he tested his biological weapons on Chinese soldiers and civilians.49 As a
result of Dr. Ishii's experiments, tens of thousands of Chinese died from
strains of plague, cholera, and anthrax from 1936 to 1941.50
In 1946, after U.S. investigation of the Unit 731 program, several
Japanese scientists were granted immunity from war crimes prosecution in
exchange for the data obtained from their research . 5 The United States
used this information to boost its own bioweapons development, which
began in 1942 at Camp Detrick, Maryland. 2 During the Korean War, the
United States' bioweapons program expanded greatly as technological
innovation allowed for "large-scale fermentation, concentration, storage,
and weaponization of microorganisms. 53 Beginning in 1953, the United
States also began experimenting with biowarfare countermeasures including
vaccines, anisera, and therapeutic agents.54
Despite amassing
approximately five thousand biological bombs and developing numerous
agents that could induce crop failure, President Nixon directed that the
program be dismantled in 1969." 5 In 1975, President Ford signed the
Biological Weapons Convention, which forbade the development,
production, or stockpiling of bioweapons. 56

48. History of Bioterrorism, supra note 45.
49. History of Bioterrorism, supra note 45; see Nova, History of Biowarfare, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/bioterror/hist-nf.html (last modified Feb. 2002) [hereinafter
"Nova website"].

50. See Sheldon Harris, Japanese Biological Warfare Research on Humans: A Case
Study of Microbiology and Ethics, in 666 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SC.:
MICROBIOLOGIST

AND

BIOLOGICAL

DEFENSE

RESEARCH:

ETHICS,

POLITICS,

AND

30-31 (Raymond A. Zilinskas ed., 1992); History of
Bioterrorism, supra note 45; Nova website, supra note 49.
51. See ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 16; History of Bioterrorism, supra note 45; Nova
website, supra note 49.
INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY 21,

52. See COMM. ON RESEARCH STANDARDS & PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE
APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH
IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 20 (2004).

53. ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 16.
54. See id.; History of Bioterrorism, supra note 45.
55. See ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 16-17; History of Bioterrorism, supra note 45.
56. The Biological Weapons Convention is also known as the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction. See ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 16-17; History of
Bioterrorism, supra note 45.
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B. CurrentBiological Weapons Threat to the United States

The actual threat of bioterrorism is rather nebulous, difficult to quantify,
and hotly contested.57
As demonstrated below, from a theoretical
standpoint, the threat of bioterrorism is very real. Recent political activity
by several state actors, as well as reported activity by several non-state
actors, can be interpreted to corroborate this threat. Yet, historical evidence
indicates that the use of biological weapons against the United States is
very unlikely.
In theory, biological weapons are attractive to terrorists and enemy states
alike. First, biological weapons seem relatively easy to develop. Several of
the most daunting biological agents can be found in nature, such as the
plague, anthrax, and tularemia.58 It has also been asserted that many
biological agents may be purchased from countries with bioweapons
programs more easily and cheaply than either a chemical or nuclear
weapon. 59 With access to the proper technology, moreover, a potential
terrorist may be able to genetically manipulate bacteria or viruses to
increase their virulence and their resistance to drug therapy. 60 Further,
because a potential bioweapon could be small and portable, there may be a
low risk of detection for those attempting to smuggle weapons into the
United States. 6 1 Finally, with a successful bioterrorist attack, there exists
the potential for a large number of casualties. For example, a single gram
of anthrax, approximately one-thirtieth of an ounce, contains one trillion

57. Compare, e.g., Gostin 1, supra note 11, at 8-9 (discussing the ease of biological
weapons development), and Thomas V. Inglesby et al., Preventing the Use of Biological
Weapons: Improving Response Should Prevention Fail, 30 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES
926, 927 (2000) (discussing increased risk of bioterrorism), and ROBERTS, supra note 46, at
23-24 (noting that despite casualties, disruption and panic may motivate bioterrorist attacks),
with Leitenberg, infra note 65, at 12 (describing the low probability of bioterrorist attacks),
and Jennifer Barrett, Scared of Smallpox, NEWSWEEK (WEB EXCLUSIVE), Oct. 18, 2001, at
National Affairs (discussing the difficulty of acquiring and delivering a bioweapon), at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3067525.
58. David T. Dennis et al., Tularemia as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public
Health Management, 285 JAMA 2763, 2764-65 (2001); Thomas V. Inglesby et al., Plague
as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management, 283 JAMA 2281, 2282
(2000);
Ctrs.
for
Disease
Control
and
Prevention,
Anthrax,
at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/disease/info/anthrax g.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
59. Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are Limitations
on PersonalEconomic LibertiesJustified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (2003) [hereinafter
Gostin 3].
60. Christopher J. Davis, Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons
Programs of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 509,
510-11 (1999); ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 18 n.54.
61. Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measuresfor Preventing Catastrophe,
24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 417, 428 (2001).
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spores, which, if properly dispersed, is enough to kill 100 million people.62
If a terrorist evenly disbursed one gram of crystalline botulinum toxin, more
than one million people could die.63 More realistically, an attack with
smallpox has the potential to infect hundreds of thousands of people and
kill tens of thousands of people.64
Presently, eleven countries have clandestine biological weapons
programs, including Iran, Syria, and North Korea.65 In addition to the
threats posed by countries possessing and developing biological weapons,
the threat of terrorists buying or stealing biological agents also exists.66 As
early as 1998, al Qaeda threatened to use biological and chemical weapons
in attacks against the United States.67 As discovery and examination of
over sixty sites in and around Afghanistan demonstrate, they have been
trying actively to develop their capabilities to use biological weapons
against the United States.68
Despite the advantages and apparent ease of obtaining. biological
weapons, terrorist organizations have used them very infrequently. Since
1993, five comprehensive databases have compiled detailed biological and
chemical weapons use worldwide during the twentieth century. 69 All
summarize the same findings:
e[t]here is an extremely low incidence of real biological (or chemical)
events, in contrast to the number of recent hoaxes... [;]
*[t]hose events that were real, and were actual examples of use, were
overwhelmingly chemical, and even in that category, involved the use of
easily available, off-the-shelf, non-synthesized industrial products. Many

62.

ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 21.

63. Stephen S. Arnon et al., Botulinum Toxin as a Biological Weapon: Medical and
Public Health Management, 285 JAMA 1059, 1059 (2001).
64. Tara O'Toole et al., Shining Light on "Dark Winter," 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 972, 975 (2002).

65. Milton Leitenberg, An Assessment of the Biological Weapons Threat to the United
States, Address at the Conference on Emerging Threats Assessment (July 7-9, 2000),
available at http://engineering.dartmouth.edu/-ethreats/whitepapers/DARTMTHB.DOC, at
4. Leitenberg cites twelve countries with biological weapons programs, including, at the
time of his presentation, Iraq. See also ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 17, 19.
66. ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 19; Gostin 3, supra note 59, at 1116.
67. ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 24; see Kimberly McCloud et al., Chart: Al-Qa'ida's
WAM Activities (Dec. 22, 2002), at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm-cht.htm (on file with
ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW) (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).

68. See Possible Weapons Labs Found in Afghanistan, CNN.cOM, Mar. 23, 2002, at
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/O3/23/ret.afghan.weapons (last visited
Nov. 11, 2004).
69. See Leitenberg, supra note 65, at 8 (listing sources for all five databases).
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of these were instances of personal murder, and not attempted as mass
casualty use. ... [E]xactly one person had been killed in the United
States in the 100 years between 1900 and 2000 as a result of an act of
biological or chemical terrorism[; and]
o[e]xcluding the preparation of ricin, a plant toxin that is relatively easy
to prepare, there are only a few recorded instances in the years 1900 to
2000 of the preparation
of biological pathogens in a private laboratory by
70
a non-state actor.
This low incidence of bioterrorism is not an oversight by terrorist
organizations.
Contrary to popular belief and media representation,
effective biological weapons are extraordinarily difficult to produce.
Producing biological weapons requires mastery of five essential elements:
1) one must obtain an appropriate strain of the biological agent; 2) know
how to handle the agent properly; 3) know how to culture the agent so that
it delivers the desired effect; 4) know how to store and produce sufficient
quantities of the agent; and 5) know how to disperse the agent properly.7 1
Historically, these criteria have proven extraordinarily difficult to fulfill.
For example, during the course of the United States' biological weapons
program, scientists gathered approximately 675 strains of Clostridium
botulinum, but only one strain ultimately proved satisfactory for weapons
development.72 Moreover, Doctor Jerzy Mierzejewski, the former director
of Poland's biological defense laboratories, spent his entire career working
with Clostridium botulinum.73
At two NATO 74 Advanced Research
Workshops, Dr. Mierzejewski described his ongoing difficulties with
consistently growing cultures with lethal levels of toxin.7 5 The doctor
recounted that even minor variations in growth parameters would seriously
alter toxin levels of the cultures.76 While former Central Intelligence
Agency director James Woolsey stated that "a B-plus high school chemistry
student" could produce large quantities of virulent biological agents,77 such
a claim seems incredulous given Dr. Mierzejewski's extensive professional
experience and his expressed frustration with producing consistent, virulent
cultures.

70.

Id. at 9 (listing detailed results of each study).

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Leitenberg, supra note 65, at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
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Professors Jonathon Tucker and Amy Sands of the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies describe the difficulty of effectively dispersing a
biological agent:
The capability to disperse microbes and toxins over a wide area as an
inhalable aerosol - the form best suited for inflicting mass casualties requires a delivery system whose development would outstrip the
technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorists. Not only
is the dissemination process for biological agents inherently complex,
is
requiring specialized equipment and expertise, but effective dispersal
V
easily disrupted by environmental and meteorological conditions. 8
Not only is it exceedingly difficult to obtain, handle, grow, store,
produce, and disperse the appropriate strain of a biological agent, but those
wishing to carry out a biological attack must also possess the knowledge
with which to complete these tasks. Consider that the Soviet Union's
biological weapons program was comprised of roughly sixty thousand
people, three thousand of whom were senior-level scientists. 79 Although
those senior scientists were experts who knew the details of their respective
stages of the weapons development process, only one hundred of them
knew how to carry a biological agent from its beginning stages to the final
stages of weapons production.80 Yet, in order for terrorists to successfully
develop a biological weapon, they must acquire the information entrusted to
none but the top scientists in a very sophisticated bioweapons program.
Perhaps the most compelling example of the difficulty terrorists face in
producing bioweapons comes from the Japanese religious cult, Aum
Shinrikyo. Headed by former Japanese Parliament candidate Shoko
Ashahara, the cult reportedly had amassed $1.5 billion through donations,
religious seminar fees, and revenues from commercial enterprises by the
mid-1990s. 81 Beginning in 1989, Aum Shinrikyo scientists and engineers
began working to develop biological weapons, experimenting with
botulinum toxin, anthrax, cholera, and Ebola.82 After failing to successfully
release botulinum toxin and anthrax in several different Japanese cities,
they spent millions of dollars attempting to purchase information from

78.

Jonathan B. Tucker & Amy Sands, An Unlikely Threat, 55 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC

SCIENTISTS 4, 51

(1999).

Leitenberg, supra note 65, at 20.
Id.
Kyle B. Olson, Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 513, 514-16 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/
olson.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
82. Id. at 514; Leitenberg, supra note 65, at 12.
79.
80.
81.
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unemployed or poorly salaried, former Soviet bioweapons experts.83 Their

efforts were unsuccessful, however, and it was not until 1995 that the cult
was able to isolate a disease strain suitable to weaponize. Although Aum

isolated an appropriate disease strain, they were unable to properly disperse
the agent, and in their nine bioterrorist attacks on Japan, no fatalities or
mass illnesses resulted.84
Aum Shinrikyo and contemporary fundamentalist terrorist groups like al
Qaeda share many of the same characteristics. They are well-funded, welleducated, patient, and perhaps most importantly, their terrorist motivations
are not irrational, but are "perfectly logical within the context of their value
system., 85 Despite these characteristics, however, Aum Shinrikyo was
unable to mount a single successful bioterrorist attack.
The Aurn Shinrikyo attacks on Japan, along with the 2001 anthrax

attacks, represent the only bioterrorist attacks occurring worldwide in the
past twenty years.86 Aum Shinrikyo's failure to successfully mount a
bioterrorist strike in Japan, moreover, should be highly instructive to our
national leaders as they develop a bioterrorism response policy. Given this
history of bioterrorist attacks and the extreme difficulty of successful
biological weapons development, it seems that fear of an imminent
bioterrorist attack is unfounded.
III. UNITED STATES' BIOTERRORISM RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

In developing an optimal bioterrorism response strategy, it is necessary
to consider the breadth of a bioterrorist attack's potential effects. Not
surprisingly, however, the effects of such an attack are exceedingly difficult
to approximate for several reasons. First, many different biological agents
could potentially be used as biological weapons, each with different
infection and fatality rates.8 7 Also, susceptibility to infection may be
83. Olson, supra note 81, at 514; Leitenberg, supra note 65, at 11; ROBERTS, supra note
46, at 23.
84. Hiroshi Takahashi et al., Bacillus anthracis Incident, Kameido, Tokyo, 1993, 10
EMERGING
INFECTIOUS
DISEASES
117,
119
(2004),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/volI Onol/03-0238.htm.
Aum Shinrikyo did launch a
successful multi-point chemical attack in March 1995. Olson, supra note 81, at 513. They
released sarin gas in five Tokyo subway trains simultaneously, killing thirteen people and
injuring several hundred. Id.
85. Olson, supra note 81, at 516.
86. In 1984, the Rajneeshee religious group released salmonella in salad bars in ten
Oregon restaurants, causing 751 people to become ill, but no fatalities resulted. ROBERTS,
supra note 46, at 23; Leitenberg, supra note 65, at 9.
87. See generally CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
SERVS.,
BIOTERRORISM
AGENTS/DISEASES,
available
at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2004) (listing
anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, and viruses like Ebola as high-priority agents
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greater among children, the elderly, and individuals with compromised
immune systems,88 which could alter the projected number of infections.89
Additionally, biological agents used as weapons can be genetically altered
to increase virulence or to increase resistance to drug therapy, which
researchers may not accurately predict. 90
The method of release, moreover, affects the rate of infection. 91 For
example, some biological agents manifest themselves differently when
insects transmit them. When fleas transmit the plague to humans, it
manifests as bubonic plague, but plague released as an aerosol manifests as
the more deadly pneumonic plague. 92 Finally, meteorological and
environmental conditions can make it impossible to predict whether a
biological agent will be transmitted effectively. 93 For example, direct
sunlight can kill anthrax spores, and indirect solar radiation can reduce their
potency. 94 Wind can also displace aerosolized particles, shortening the
period of time during which people can contract the disease. 95
Aside from determining how quickly and how far a disease is likely to
spread in any given period of time, assessing the public health system's
ability to handle a large-scale biological attack is critical to determining an
optimal response strategy. Assessing local and state health departments'
responsiveness is critical because public health officials are among the
epidemic, and a quick, effective response is
primary initial responders to an 96
the key to saving people's lives.
There have been several comprehensive studies examining hypothetical
biological attacks and the public health system's responsiveness to these

that can be easily transmitted, can result in high mortality rates, and might cause public

panic; listing brucellosis, epsilon toxin, salmonella, glanders, Q fever, ricin, viral
encephalitis and others as second-degree diseases that are moderately easy to disseminate but
result in low mortality rates).

88.
89.

Such as individuals with HIV/AIDS, cancer, or other illnesses.
See Donald A. Henderson et al., Smallpox as a Biological

Weapon,

281 JAMA

2127, 2130 (1999); Gostin 3, supra note 59, at 1124-25.

90.

Gostin 3, supra note

59,

at 1124-25.

91. Seeid. at1125n.114.
CBRNE - Plague, at
92. See Demetres Velendzas & Susan Dufel,
http://www.emedicine.com/emerg/topic428.htm, section 2 (last updated June 29, 2004)
(stating that pneumonic plague has 100% a mortality rate if untreated in twenty-four hours,
whereas bubonic plague has a 40-60% mortality rate if untreated).
93. See, e.g., Takahashi et al., supra note 84, at 119; Tucker & Sands, supra note 78, at
51.
94. Takahashi et al., supra note 84, at 119.
95. See Tucker & Sands, supra note 78, at 51.
96. See IOM Report, supra note 8, at 141; Matthew B. Stannard, Experts Laud U.S.
Programto Counter BioterrorAttack, S.F. CHRON., July 23, 2004, at A19.
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attacks. 97 Two of the most instructive of these simulated tabletop exercises,
TOPOFFand Dark Winter, are examined below, along with an analysis of
the 2001 anthrax attacks.98
A. TOPOFF
In May 2000, the Department of Justice conducted an exercise to engage
top officials in a simulated bioterrorist attack (TOPOFF).99 TOPOFFwas

designed to test those officials' responsiveness to three simultaneous
terrorist attacks. The attacks included a chemical weapons attack on
Portsmouth, New Hampshire; a radiological event in Washington, DC; and
a biological attack in Denver; Colorado.'0 0 The TOPOFFteam released an
aerosol form of Yersinia pestis in Denver, a city chosen because of its prior
bioterrorism preparedness training. 10 1 Despite the Denver officials'
previous training, problematic leadership and decision-making issues
arose. 0 2 Officials expressed difficulty prioritizing and distributing scarce
resources, managing the crises in health care facilities resulting from the
attack, and developing effective disease containment measures to prevent
fearful Denver residents from fleeing the state. 0 3
Within three days of the attack, 500 cases of the plague had been
reported by Denver area hospitals.10 4 The Colorado Department of Public

97. For information regarding the various outbreak investigations, see David A. Ashford
et al., Planning Against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations, 9
EMERGING

INFECTIOUS

DISEASES

515

(2003),

available

at

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol9no5/02-0388.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
98. From May 12-16, 2003, the largest, most comprehensive national terrorism exercise
took place, depicting detonation of a radiological dispersal device in Seattle, WA, and
dispersal of pneumonic plague in Chicago, IL. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ToP
OFFICIALS (TOPOFF) EXERCISE SERIES: TOPOFF 2, at 2 (2003), available at

http://www.armymars.net/ArmyMARS/Emergency~ps/Resources/TOPOFF2_Report Final_
Public.PDF (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). This article does not discuss TOPOFF2 because it
provided participants both notice of the specific scenario in the exercise, as well as a preexercise roundtable discussion to explore intergovernmental strategies, and a series of preexercise seminars focusing on bioterrorism, national direction issues, and national control
issues. Id. TOPOFFwas a no-notice exercise. Thus, because TOPOFF2 participants were
aware of the scenario before the exercise began, and had formal discussions and seminars
regarding their anticipated response, it did not represent a true simulated biological attack.
Id.
99. Thomas V. Inglesby et al., A Plague on Your City: Observationsfrom TOPOFF,32
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 436, 436 (2001).

100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. Yersinia pestis is the bacterium that causes the plague. ld.
Id. at 439; Thomas May, PoliticalAuthority in a Bioterror Emergency, 32 J.L.

MED. & ETHICS 159, 160 (2004).

103.
104.

Inglesby et al., supra note 99, at 437.
Id.
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Health and Environment notified the CDC of the increased volume of sick
patients, and the CDC confirmed the outbreak of the plague. 10 5 By the end
of the next day, 1,871 cases of the plague had been reported throughout the
United States, England, and Japan. 10 6 When the exercise was terminated six
days later, approximately 4,000 people were infected and the estimated
number of fatalities ranged from 950 to 2,000.107 At least eleven states and
two other countries had reported outbreaks of the plague.'0 8 Participants
noted that inadequate medical facilities and supplies contributed to the rapid
spread of the disease and the high number of deaths.10 9
Most significantly, TOPOFF highlights the need for leadership and
definitive decision-making processes following bioterrorist attacks.
Throughout the exercise, participants noted their confusion as to who had
ultimate decision-making authority regarding issues such as implementing
curfew, initiating quarantines, closing city and state borders, and
maintaining security for and access to medical facilities." 0 Lack of clear
leadership, moreover, led to indecision."' For instance, one participant
noted that decisions made on one day were reversed the next morning, and
reversed again that afternoon. 112 Some senior health officials thought the
state public health agency was the highest authority, while others could not
FBI
definitively say who was in charge." 3 It was also noted that
4 the
assumed that the state Attorney General's office was in charge."
B. Dark Winter
On June 22-23, 2001, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense
Strategies conducted a tabletop exercise to study challenges that seniorlevel federal and state policy makers" 5 would address in the event of a
bioterrorist attack on the United States." 6 Authors of the Dark Winter
105. Id.
106. Id. at 438.
107. Id.; May, supra note 102, at 160.
108. Inglesby et al., supra note 99, at 438, 441.
109. See May, supra note 102, at 160.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. The state Attorney General's office is the office to which the FBI must report in
times of crisis. Inglesby et al., supra note 99, at 439.
115. Twelve participants, who themselves were high-level government or military
officials, portrayed members of the National Security Council. O'Toole et al., supra note
64, at 972.
116. Id. The exercise was also held in collaboration with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, the Analytic Services Institute for Homeland Security, and the
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exercise chose to examine smallpox, historically perceived to be the most
feared biological agent available because of its disfiguring side effects, its
highly contagious
nature, its thirty percent fatality rate, and its resistance to
7
treatment. "1
In the Dark Winter scenario, the smallpox virus was released
simultaneously in three separate shopping malls in Atlanta, Oklahoma City,
and Philadelphia." 8 Three thousand people initially were infected." 9
Although transmission rates of diseases are affected by many factors, the
authors conservatively estimated that each infected victim would transmit
the virus to at least ten others. 20 Even at this conservative transmission
rate, the first 3,000 people infected would infect another 30,000 people at
the second-generation stage, spreading to twenty-five states and ten other
countries.
Although the exercise ended a few days after the secondgeneration infection, the authors estimated that, at worst, the 1:10
transmission rate would continue through the third and fourth generation
stages, thus infecting approximately 3.3 million people. 122 Considering that
smallpox has a thirty percent mortality rate, more than one million people
23
potentially could have died from the Dark Winter smallpox outbreak. 1
The authors of Dark Winter drew several conclusions about the United
States' bioterrorist response capabilities, two of which are most relevant for
this discussion. First, they recognized that federal and state leaders are
"unfamiliar with the character of bioterrorist attacks, available policy
options, and their consequences.' 24 Specifically, decision makers were
familiar with neither the events that would follow a bioterrorist attack, nor
with public health strategies used to care for a large number of sick
people. 125
Second, "[fiederal and state priorities may be unclear, differ, or conflict;
authorities may be uncertain; and constitutional issues may arise.' 26 There
were several specific contexts in which tensions developed between federal
and state authorities over disease-containment decisions, such as the
Oklahoma National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 974.
119. Id.
120. O'Toole et al., supra note 64, at 974-75. The researchers based their estimates on
an analysis of thirty-four instances of smallpox infections that occurred in Europe between
1958 and 1973. Id.at 974.
121. See id. at 975, 979.
122. Id. at 975-76.
123. Id. at 975.
124. Id.at 980.
125. Id.
126. O'Toole et al., supranote 64, at 982.
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imposition of quarantines and mandatory vaccination, whether to close state
borders to all transportation, and whether to close airports. 127 Federal
officials argued that such issues were within the domain of the federal
government, which needed to ensure the safety and defend the interests of
the entire country. 128 Understandably, however, state leaders representing
states most affected by smallpox wanted every resource and vaccine
available to the citizens of their respective states. 129 Thus, there was
tremendous tension between individual states' interests and national
interests over safeguards and access to limited resources.
C. Anthrax Attacks
The 2001 anthrax attacks are more instructive of state and federal
bioterrorism responsiveness than either Dark Winter or TOPOFF. In late
September 2001, an individual in a Florida office building was reportedly
exposed to anthrax. 130 On October 2, another 63-year-old Florida man was
admitted to the hospital with a high fever, vomiting, and incoherent
speech. 131 The doctor examined that patient's spinal fluid, suspected an
anthrax infection, and notified the Florida Department of Health, which
confirmed the doctor's diagnosis on October 4.132 Within a month of the
first reported case, twenty-three cases of anthrax had been reported in
Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, and
Washington, DC. 133 Twenty-two
cases of anthrax were reported, and five
134
people eventually died.
Although there were few confirmed anthrax infections, the response
effort stretched state and federal resources thin. Officials interviewed over
five thousand people, 135 tested over 120,000 lab samples, 136 decontaminated
numerous buildings, 137 and administered antibiotics to more than 30,000

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See James G. Hodge, Jr., Bioterrorism Law and Policy: CriticalChoices in Public

Health, 30 J.L MED. & ETHICS 254, 255 (2002).

131. Marc S. Traeger et al., First Case of Bioterrorism-RelatedInhalationalAnthrax in
the United States, Palm Beach County, Florida, 2001, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
1035, 1035 (2002).
132. Id.
133. Hodge, Jr., supranote 130, at 255.
134. Julie Louise Gerberding et al., Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response:
Clinicians andPublic Health Agencies as EssentialPartners,287 JAMA 898, 898 (2002).
135. Developments in Anthrax Scare, KANSAS CITY STAR, Sept. 27, 2001.
136. An expense that totaled over $13 million. See id.
137. Id.
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people. 138 Thankfully, these acts of bioterrorism did not result in massive
casualties, although they served as "a giant field exercise"' 39 for much of
the country's local governments as well as much of the federal
government's manpower and resources.
D. Public Health Departments'ResponseCapabilities
As Dark Winter and TOPOFF demonstrated, the capacity of many
agencies to respond was severely diminished during a bioterrorist attack. In
their assessment of state and local public health departments in relation to
the 2001 anthrax attacks, Professors Keck and Erme 140 identified several
significant shortcomings. First, a properly trained staff is essential for the
proper functioning of a public health department. 14 Most public health
departments, however, did not have staff members who were trained for
communicable disease control, let alone likely bioweapons agents. 142 The
CDC, moreover, estimated that approximately eighty percent of public
health employees lacked formal training in public health. 143 They were
unable to "provide information on anthrax to the media, medical personnel,
or the general public.' 44 They lacked "training on bioterrorism agents and
have little background in microbiology or the epidemiology of infectious
diseases.,'145 As a result, these departments likely will have difficulty
implementing timely control measures and working with the local medical
community, particularly as "major changes in technology, biomedical
knowledge, informatics, and community expectations... continue to
challenge and redefine the practice of public health.
,,146
The second criterion for proper public health functioning is a properly
sized staff. 47 Yet during the anthrax attacks, most public health
departments were staffed at levels that only allowed timely response to
problems anticipated from previous experience. 148 Thus, because these
138. See Anthony S. Fauci & H. Clifford Lane, Bioterrorism on the Homefront: A New
Challengefor American Medicine, 286 JAMA 2595, 2595 (2001).
139. See C. William Keck & Marguerite A. Erme, Strengthening the Public Health
System 245, 248-49, in TERRORISM AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Barry S. Levy & Victor W. Sidel
eds., 2003).
140. Director and member, respectively, of the Office of Public Health Practice at
Northeastern Ohio Universities College of Medicine [NEOUCOM].
141. See IOM Report, supra note 8, at 116.
142. Keck & Erme, supra note 139, at 251.
143. See IOM Report, supra note 8, at 116.
144. Keck & Erme, supra note 139, at 252.
145. Id.
146. IOM Report, supra note 8, at 116; see id. at 251.
147. See IOM Report, supra note 8, at 116.
148. Id.
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departments had never experienced a bioterrorist attack, they were grossly
understaffed to meet what the situation demanded.
In its 1997 survey of local health departments, the National Association
of County and City Health Officials found that nationwide, health
departments had an average of seventy-two full-time equivalent personnel,
while the median was only sixteen full-time equivalent personnel. 49 The
large gap between the mean and median figures is significant, indicating
that although health departments on average had seventy-two full-time
equivalent personnel, at least half of all health departments had sixteen or
fewer full-time equivalent personnel. 50 In 1999, moreover, individual
states reported a range of employees from 1.4 to 89 staff per 1 million
" ' Therefore, not only were there wide gaps in the number of
people.15
employees between local health departments within any given state, but
there also were tremendous differences in the number of employees from
Furthermore, more recent
state to state relative to the population.
information shows that public health department staff levels are declining,
sixty-seven full-time equivalent
with the nationwide average down to
1 52
thirteen.
only
of
median
a
and
personnel
Although this change may not seem significant, Professors Keck and
Erme note that this difference in staff size is drastic.'53 In response to the
2001 anthrax attacks, for instance, public health departments' response
capabilities were evaluated. 154 The results of the January 2002 survey
indicated that due to very limited staff, health departments were unable to
provide timely responses to community needs and were quickly "burned
out" from attempting to provide around the clock support. 5 In Ohio,
public health department employees were working around the clock
at
because of staff limitations and were understandably less effective
156
providing the level of assistance demanded under the circumstances.
The public health departments' facilities are a third critical component of
their success, 157 but deficiencies were evident during the 2001 anthrax
attacks. For example, many local public health departments had neither the

149. See Keck & Erme, supra note 139, at 247.
150. This great difference likely reflects the number of employees in rural local health
departments versus the number of employees in a major metropolitan health department.
151. 1OM Report, supranote 8, at 138 n. 11.
152. See Keck & Erme, supranote 139, at 247.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Seeid. at 251.
156. See id.
157. See IOM Report, supra note 8, at 137; Keck & Erme, supra note 139, at 251.
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158
resources nor the technical training to implement newer technology.
Consequently, these departments had great difficulty keeping apprised of
important new anthrax-related information. 159 Indeed, only half of all state
and local public health departments had Internet availability.1 60 This alone
16 1
was crippling given that there were frequent electronic anthrax updates.
Public health laboratories are the most important tools to detect, identify,
and monitor disease within a community. As of the General Accounting
Office's 1999 survey, there were 158,000 clinical laboratories nationwide,
100,000 of which were either privately owned, or located in physicians'
offices. 162 Every state public health department had at least one clinical
163
laboratory, but many local public health departments had no laboratories.
This problem was exacerbated by having a laboratory staff that was not
trained to identify biological weapons agents. 164 Because many of the local
laboratories were limited in their ability to perform microbiological tests,
16
they were forced to request additional support from state laboratories. 1
During the anthrax attacks, this was indeed the case, as state health
department laboratories were flooded with requests from the local health
departments to test substances for anthrax. 166 This resulted in pushing state
laboratories to maximum capacity, leaving little room to perform other
regular and necessary functions. 167 The insufficiency of laboratory facilities
does not end at the local level, however. During the 1999 West Nile Virus
outbreak in New York, both the state's labs and the CDC's lab were pushed
to capacity. 168 In fact, federal officials stated that if another outbreak had
169
occurred during that time, the CDC would have been unable to respond.
Dark Winter, TOPOFF,and the 2001 anthrax attacks illustrate areas in
which state and local public health infrastructure needed reform. There was
lack of clear leadership among state and federal authorities, which
frequently led to indecision or tension between federal and state authorities

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See IOM Report, supra note 8, at 134.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HEHS-99-26, CONSENSUS ON
NEEDED LABORATORY FACILITIES COULD STRENGTHEN SURVEILLANCE 7 (1999).
163. See id.
164. See Keck & Erme, supra note 139, at 251.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See GEN. ACCOUTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HEHS-00-180, WEST NILE VIRUS
OUTBREAK: LESSONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 29-30 (2000).
169. See id. at 30.
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during times when quick decisions were demanded. 170 Resources at the
local, state, and federal levels were grossly insufficient to respond to a
bioterrorist attack. In Dark Winter, the CDC was in short supply of the
smallpox vaccine, which led to a struggle between local and federal
authorities as to the proper allocation-of the medicine. 171 In TOPOFF,there
was a short supply of the antibiotics and ventilators needed to treat plague
victims.172 During the anthrax attacks, local health departments were
unable to provide sufficient support to their communities because of limited
173
training, experience, manpower, facilities, and laboratory support.
Although reform efforts are continuing, many of the state and local public
health problems persist today.
IV. TOWARD STATE REGIONALIZATION
A. Individual States Are Ill-Equipped to Respond to a BioterroristAttack
A fter the 2001 anthrax attacks, the public health infrastructure came
under heavy scrutiny, and policymakers identified many weaknesses
including: outdated health information systems, poorly trained public health
employees, insufficient laboratory facilities, ineffective and fragmented
communications networks, and incomplete bioterrorism preparedness and
response. 174 In 2002, Congress granted $1.8 billion to state and local health
departments to improve
these deficiencies and promote overall public
75
health preparedness.1
In 2003, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and
Trust for America's Health (TFAH) each conducted surveys evaluating
state and local health departments' progress since the 2001 anthrax
attacks. 176 The results of these surveys indicate that while there was some
baseline improvement in all states, there was great disparity in preparedness
between individual public health departments. 177 Moreover, despite $1.8

172.
173.

See discussion supra Part 11I.A. - III.C.
See O'Toole et al., supra note 64, at 976-79.
See Inglesby et al., supra note 99, at 437-38.
See Keck & Erme, supranote 139, at 251.

174.

See IOM Report, supranote 8, at 3. These issues were discussed supra Part III.C.

175.

TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, READY OR NOT?

170.
171.

PROTECTING THE PUBLIC'S

(2003),
available
http://healthyamericans.org/state/bioterror/Bioterror.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
HEALTH

IN

THE

AGE

OF

BIOTERRORISM

1

at

176. See generally GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO-04-360R, HI-IS
BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS: STATES REPORTED PROGRESS BUT FELL SHORT OF

PROGRAM GOALS FOR 2002 (2004) [hereinafter GAO-04-360R]; id. Trust for America's
Health is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that researches public health from the
perspective of community-based prevention and protection.
177.

GAO-04-360R, supra note 176, at 3; TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, supra note
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billion in federal aid, state and local 78public health departments are still
underprepared for a bioterrorist attack. 1
The CDC surveyed local and state public health departments throughout
the country from February 2002 to August 2003 to assess their progress in
bioterrorism preparedness after the 2001 anthrax attacks and receipt of the
$1.8 billion federal grant. 179 Prior to this assessment, the CDC designated
fourteen requirements1 8as
critical benchmarks for tracking public health
0
departments' progress.
The CDC data showed that most states improved with respect to four of
the most critical factors, including improved laboratory facilities, increased
Health Alert Network (HAN) coverage, risk communication and health
information dissemination, and education and training.18' For example,
during the 2001 anthrax attacks, only sixty-six percent of the U.S.
population was covered by HAN, a system that has since expanded to cover
ninety percent of the population, greatly improving the ability of local,
state, and federal officials to quickly share critical information during an
epidemic. 82 On the other hand, few states have developed statewide or
regional emergency response
plans; 83 only about half of the states met the
184
objectives.
eight
remaining
TFAH's December 2003 report also found that while most states have
made improvements in some critical preparedness areas, they have failed to
175, at 7.
178. See GAO-04-360R, supra note 176, at 4; TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, supra
note 175, at 26.
179. See GAO-04-360R, supranote 176, at 9.
180. The CDC examined whether states had (1) designated an executive director of the
bioterrorism preparedness and response program; (2) established a bioterrorism advisory
committee; (3) assessed their epidemiological capacities and staffed at least one
epidemiologist for each Metropolitan Statistical Area; (4) expanded the Health Alert
Network to cover 90% of its population; (5) developed a statewide response plan for
incidents of bioterrorism and other public health threats and emergencies, and provisions for
exercising the plan; (6) developed a regional response plan across state borders for incidents
of bioterrorism and other public health threats and emergencies; (7) assessed emergency
preparedness and response capabilities; (8) assessed statutes, regulations, and ordinances that
provided for credentialing, licensure, and delegation of authority for executing emergency
public health measures; (9) developed an interim plan to receive and manage items from the
Strategic National Stockpile; (10) developed a system to receive and evaluate urgent disease
reports at all times; (11) developed plan to improve working relationships and
communication between clinical and public health laboratories; (12) developed a
communications system that provides for flow of critical health information at all times; (13)
developed an interim plan for risk communication; and (14) prepared a timeline to assess
training needs. Id. at 28-30.
181. Seeid.at28.
182. See id. at 3; TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, supra note 175, at 20.
183. GAO-04-360R, supra note 176, at 3.
184. See id.
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make many essential improvements, "reveal[ing] that state public health
agencies are facing fundamental, structural problems that threaten the
' 85
nation's ability to respond to a large-scale public health emergency.'
TFAH's advisory committee of state and local officials and public health
experts assessed states' improvements and vulnerabilities in ten areas that it
identified as "key indicators" of preparedness.1 86 The indicators address
funding issues, health infrastructure issues, and whether a state can balance
its responsibilities to deal with naturally occurring threats and terrorist
threats.1 87 Eighty-three percent of the states satisfied five or fewer of the
ten indicators. 88 The surveyors concluded that "while states have achieved
piecemeal progress . . . [t]he scores indicate that, despite the surge in federal
funds, states are only modestly more prepared to respond to health
emergencies than they were prior to 9/11 .,,89
TFAH also found that despite the $1.8 billion federal assistance to states,
public health budgets are declining. 90 Before developing their 2003
budgets, states collectively faced $49.1 billion in deficits; over the course of
the year, they incurred an additional $17.5 billion deficit.' 9' TFAH
estimated, moreover, that the 2004 budget deficit would climb to $78
billion. 192 It is no surprise, therefore, that public health departments are in
the midst of hiring freezes, skilled worker shortages, and a resultant
diminished preparedness capacity. 193 Despite these figures, eighteen states
were able to maintain or increase their pubic health budgets, widening the
increasingly evident gap9 4 between different state health departments'
preparedness capabilities. 1
Although the report found that public health laboratories have improved
since 2001, only six states indicated that their facilities presently allow for
sufficient emergency surge capacity, a dramatic demand for resources in an
185. TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, supra note 175, at 5.
186. The key indicators examined (1) whether a state spent or obligated at least 90% of
federal funds allocated in FY 2002; (2) allocated at least 50% of federal funds to local health
departments; (3) increased or maintained its public health spending; (4) whether the state
health department has a sufficient amount of workers to distribute Strategic National
Stockpile supplies; (5) has at least on e Biosafety Level-3 Lab; (6) has enough Level-3 labs
to handle a public health emergency; (7) has 3 or fewer counties without emergency alert
capabilities; (8) had an initial bioterrorism plan; (9) has a pandemic flu plan; and (10) had
state-specific information about SARS during the crisis. Id. at 7.
187. Id. at9.
188. See id. at 6.
189. Id. at6.
190. Id. at9.
191. TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, supra note 175, at 12.
192. Id.
193. Id. at9.
194. Id. at 12.
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emergency.195 A primary area of concern is the need to develop and
improve data exchange systems, which would facilitate the dissemination of
current information among local, state, and federal agencies in a
bioterrorism response situation.196 Although the $1.8 billion federal
allocation undoubtedly has led to some public health reforms, because of
state budget constraints and workforce shortages, laboratories will likely
continue to struggle to meet the
demands of bioterrorism response without
197
sustained federal financial aid.
B. State Regionalizationfor InitialBioterrorismResponse
State public health law itself is partly to blame for states' inability to
prepare for a bioterrorist attack. Much of state public health law is
antiquated. 198 Public health departments developed in the early nineteenth
century as rudimentary, voluntary groups organized to educate the public
about hygiene, lobby for administrative reform, and help eliminate
unsanitary living conditions, largely as a result of city overcrowding. 199
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, public health
departments were given broad investigative authority, and developed a
complex legal and administrative structure composed of food safety laws,
building codes, and social welfare programs. 200 During their shift from
social effectors to medical actors in the mid-twentieth century, public health
departments implemented communicable disease law mirroring the form in
which it largely exists today.20' Thus, the bulk of states' public health law
is forty to one hundred years old and does not reflect modem legal norms or
contemporary mechanisms of disease prevention and control.20 2
Public health law is not only antiquated, but also is comprised of
multiple layers of law.20 3 Most states have enacted layers of statutes and
amendments to reflect changes in health threats over the last one hundred
years.20 4 Additionally, because state public health laws have evolved
independently, they "show profound variations in their structure, substance,

195. Id. at 19.
196. Id.
197. TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, supra note 175, at 9.
198. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of Infectious
DiseaseLaw in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 59, 102 (1999) [hereinafter Gostin 4].
199.

GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 209-11 (expanded ed., Johns

Hopkins U. Press 1993) (1958); id.
at 77.
200. Gostin 4, supra note 198, at 77.
201.

See id. at 77-78.

202.
203.
204.

See 10M Report, supra note 8, at 104.
Id. at 105.
Id.
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and procedures for detecting, controlling, and preventing injury and
disease. 2 °5 These differences, however, hinder public health departments'
abilities to respond quickly in emergency situations, creating a major
liability during an age of diseases like SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome), which can spread throughout the world within a month's
time. °6
MSEHPA offers a single, uniform model act by which states can seek to
avoid the problems associated with antiquated and layered state public
health laws that have evolved. independently of one another. By offering
clear guidelines, MSEHPA seeks to avoid the problems of indecision, lack
of clear leadership authority, and lack of clear decision-making processes,
which troubled participants of TOPOFF and Dark Winter. However,
because MSEHPA focuses on individual states, each of which has a
different resource level and response capability, it does little to strengthen
the United States' bioterrorism responsiveness.
Consider the travel habits of Americans in the twenty-first century.
Today, people travel across state lines with great frequency. Thousands of
flights take place, carrying people to cities throughout the country and to
nearly one hundred countries each day.20 7 Additionally, trains transport
thousands of business people daily between Boston, New York,
208
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, DC, for instance.
Consequently, diseases spread much more quickly, and reach a much larger
population than in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1913, for
example, the Spanish flu spread throughout the world in eleven months,
whereas in 2003, SARS took less than one month. 20 9 The Dark Winter
scenario also demonstrated that a bioterrorist attack initially affecting 3,000
people can spread to over 30,000 people in twenty-five states and ten
countries in only three days.2
Given the speed with which diseases are capable of spreading, and the
ever-widening public health department resource-level differences
identified by the recent CDC and TFAH reports, any bioterrorism response
strategy must be implemented with some level of uniformity in order to

205.

Id.

206.

See NPR: Talk of the Nation/ScienceFriday,supra note 42, at *13.

207. See, e.g., U.S. Airways, at http://usair.com/about/corporate/profile/factsheets/
index.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
at
http://www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?
208. See,
e.g.,
Amtrak,
pagename=Amtrak/am2Copy/Title ImageCopyPage&c=am2Copy&cid= 1081442674300
&ssid= 174 (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
209. NPR: Talk of the Nation/ScienceFriday,supra note 42, at *13.
210. O'Toole et al., supra note 64, at 979.
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strengthen the United States' responsiveness.21 1 Consider two adjoining
states that have greatly different resource levels. The first state has fewer
laboratories, fewer full-time employees relative to the state's population, is
faced with budget deficits, a hiring freeze, and untrained workers. The
second state, on the other hand, is one of the six states identified by TFAH
as having laboratories capable of handling surges during emergencies, has
more full-time employees relative to the state's population, has been given
an increased public health budget, is able to continue hiring employees, and
is presently implementing programs to educate current employees about
potential bioterrorist agents. In the event of a bioterrorist attack, under the
MSEHPA model, the second state is obviously much better prepared to
effectively respond, and the first state is likely to suffer a greater number of
casualties. If situations like this scenario were spread throughout the
United States, our national responsiveness would be quite poor with many
states faced with containment problems, scarce resources, overwhelmed
laboratories, and high casualty rates.
Thus, recognizing both the need for model legislation to combat
antiquated and layered state public health law, as well as the need to offset
the present public health resource imbalance within and between states, this
article urges that legislators consider developing a model act that
encourages a regionalized response effort among states.
A state
regionalization model act could provide clear leadership authority and
decision-making processes, like MSEHPA, as well as help normalize the
response capabilities of states regardless of individual state resource levels,
ultimately helping to optimize national response capabilities.
Regionalization is not a new concept. Local public health departments
21
already are regionalized, as are many federal agencies. 212 Responsibilities
of regionalized agencies fall within one of three possibilities: sub-state,
multi-state, and federal.2 13 Local health departments, for instance, operate
on a sub-state level and are regionalized by either municipal boundaries, as
in the northeastern United States, or by counties, more common in western
states. 14 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Environmental
211. Indeed, under the MSEHPA model, states that have fewer resources and lesser
response capabilities might become attractive targets for potential bioterrorists because of
the potential for greater casualties.
212. STANFORD-UCSF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE CTR., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RESEARCH AND QUALITY, AHRQ PUB. No. 04-E016-2, REGIONALIZATION OF BIOTERRORISM
PREPAREDNESS
AND
RESPONSE
37,
44-45,
47
(2004),
available
at
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/evrptpdfs.htm#bioreg (last visited Nov. 20, 2004) [hereinafter
AHRQ Report].
213. See id. at 37.
214. Id.
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Protection Agency (EPA) are all regionalized in the same multi-state
jurisdictions, generally comprised of between four and eight states.215
The recent CDC survey revealed that after receiving $1.8 billion in
federal aid, states have failed to adequately: develop preparedness planning
and readiness assessment; develop a communications system that provides
for flow of critical health information at all times; prepare a statewide
response plan; and prepare a regional response plan, among other things. 1 6
Likewise, the TFAH report highlighted the disparities between state health
departments, driven primarily by vast differences in states' budgets,
laboratories, staffing, and technology within their facilities.2 17
Regionalizing bioterrorism response among local health departments
within each state, as well as between neighboring states' health
departments 21s would serve to alleviate many of the problems identified by
the CDC and TFAH reports. 219 Pooling resources in preparation of a
bioterrorist attack would aid states developing preparedness planning and
readiness assessment, communication systems, and response plans. By
helping one another develop and implement the same systems to be applied
uniformly throughout the region, states would significantly reduce both the
amount of money needed to implement a comprehensive plan and the
amount of time necessary to develop a comprehensive plan. Administrative
costs are also likely to be lower because rather than having four to eight
individual systems within any given region, there would be only one
Pooling resources would also
uniform system applied throughout.
implicitly combat the problems associated with unequal resource levels
across states. Thus states with lower public health budgets, fewer
laboratories, less staffing, or inadequate technology would be aided by
states within their regions, such that a uniformity in resources and response
capabilities would result. 220
215. See id.
216. See GAO-04-360R, supra note 176, at 3.
217. See supra notes 185-197 and accompanying text.
218. States would ideally copy the federal framework in defining their regions in order
to facilitate eventual federal aid during a bioterrorist attack.
219. One way to accomplish this regionalization is to utilize the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact, a model compact that has been adopted by every state
except California and Hawaii, to form contractual regions that mirror those used by FEMA,
HHS, and the EPA. NAT'L EMERGENCY MGMT. ASS'N, EMERGENCY MGMT. ASSISTANCE
COMPACT, available at http://www.emacweb.org/EMAC/AboutEMAC/What-isEmac.cfm

(last visited Nov. 11, 2004).

220. Taxpayers are likely to object that their wealthier state is paying to aid a state with
fewer resources rather than reinforcing its own, thus weakening its responsiveness. Such an
argument cannot stand, however, if one conceptualizes the tax contribution as providing the
best bioterrorism preparedness strategy available, such that the tax contribution, although
aiding another state, results in a better defense for the taxpayer's state than had the money
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Finally, by implementing regions of states that mirror the framework
already used by many federal agencies, state regionalization would facilitate
the federal government's eventual aid during a bioterrorist attack. Unlike
MSEHPA, which envisions fifty states that need federal assistance, each of
which has a different resource level and therefore a different level of need,
state regionalization suggests using the federal ten-region system already in
place. Thus, the federal government must only assess the needs of ten
separate regions and may be able to administer aid from its agencies'
offices representing the region in need.
Operating from the premise that the goal of an optimal bioterrorist
preparedness and response plan is disease containment and protection of the
greatest number of people possible, it seems unlikely that MSEHPA is the
best option available. Rather, a state regionalization model act presents an
opportunity to offer the benefits of MSEHPA, as well as to correct the
problems that MSEHPA cannot.
State regionalization would ease
individual states' burdens of developing response plans and communication
systems, levels resource imbalances, and would facilitate federal aid
through its structure.
CONCLUSION

The Institute of Medicine recently concluded that state and local public
health infrastructures are as disordered now as they were in 1988 .221 The
2001 terrorist events, along with the TOPOFFand Dark Winter exercises,
further highlighted this disarray.222 Despite nearly $2 billion in federal aid
since 2002, the CDC and TFAH indicate that improvements in public health
departments are marginal, reporting varying degrees of progress, resource
levels, and bioterrorism preparedness among local and state public health
departments.223
Both organizations conclude that states remain
underprepared to sufficiently respond to a bioterrorist attack. 4
The bioterrorism response plan that MSEHPA offers cannot correct the
shortcomings in the public health system, nor can it hope to provide an
optimal national response to a bioterrorist attack. By focusing on individual
states' responses rather than recognizing that a bioterrorist attack is likely to
affect many states, drafters of MSEHPA ignore both the problems identified
been spent in-state. Furthermore, if regionalization does indeed lower administrative costs,
then the taxpayer's contribution to another state might be offset by the savings realized instate.
221. IOM Report, supra note 8, at 100.
222. See discussion supra Part III.A. - III.C.
223. See GAO-04-360R, supra note 176, at 3; TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, supra
note 175, at 5.
224.

See GAO-04-360R, supra note 176, at 3.
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by the CDC and TFAH reports and the need for a national level of
responsiveness. Unfortunately, the hastily-drafted act is quickly leading
individual states and the nation down the wrong path for an optimal
bioterrorism response strategy.
This article has suggested a state regionalization model act framework
that would maximize states' resources on a national level, provide a
uniform mechanism for bioterrorism response, and facilitate federal aid in
the event of a bioterrorist attack. Moreover, this Article has argued that
because there is little likelihood of a bioterrorist attack occurring in the
foreseeable future, states should not feel bound by any present bioterrorism
response policy simply because of the popular belief that a bioterrorist
attack is foreseeably imminent. Therefore, even in the event that the state
regionalization model proferred by this Article is ultimately rejected, states
should nonetheless carefully reconsider their current bioterrorism response
policies and their ability to ultimately improve our national responsiveness
to a bioterrorist attack.
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